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NATO:
Adjusting the Alliance From Consultation to Negotiation

An Intelligence Assessment

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Key Judgments

West Europeans increasingly question the three fundamental assumptions on which NATO rests: US economic and military preeminence; close identity of US and West European interests in the NATO area; and an unambiguous Soviet threat to Western Europe. This questioning is leading the West Europeans to reexamine their security options and probably will ultimately result in a significant adjustment, but not a replacement of the NATO Alliance.

The West Europeans will insist on a much greater voice in NATO decisionmaking. If NATO is to retain West European confidence, it will have to serve as an effective vehicle for multilateral negotiations, rather than simple consultations, among the allies. The allies are not seeking a diminution of US preeminence in NATO, but they believe that a greater West European role is necessary to ensure improved allied policies and continued domestic support for NATO membership.

The allies' efforts to forge a new, more equal relationship with the United States are colored by their overriding determination to save detente. Most West Europeans view detente as a safety valve in East-West relations; a few hope that it is a step toward a permanent reduction in European tensions.

The arms control and modernization problems facing NATO are the first tangible signs of the readjustment process. In the past two years the allies have managed to shift the emphasis from force improvement to arms control. They continue to stress the importance of arms control despite the current SALT and MBFR difficulties.

In contrast, the allies' commitment to the long-term defense program is uneven, as is their compliance with NATO defense spending goals. The Alliance debate over long-range theater nuclear force modernization probably foreshadows what will happen in future considerations of SALT, in that the United States will have to negotiate first with its allies and then with Moscow.

Although NATO probably will remain the focus of West European security, under certain circumstances the allies could look for a new security orientation. If they believed that the United States were becoming progressively weaker and therefore less able to carry out its security responsibilities, they might feel a need to replace the US strategic umbrella. On the other hand, if

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they found US policy so inimical to their interests that it seemed a threat rather than an addition to their security, the allies might reexamine their basic relationship to both superpowers.

A West European alternative to NATO, however, would be difficult to create. A West European defense community, necessary if the West Europeans hoped to compete with the Soviet Union, would be hampered by rivalries and serious disputes over military force structures and missions. A search for a West European deterrent might leave the allies totally unprotected if Washington were too quickly convinced that Western Europe could handle its own defense and withdrew US troops and nuclear guarantees from the region.

"Finlandization"—making West European security policies responsive to Soviet interests in return for guarantees against a Soviet military threat—would require an unlikely combination of a general political turn to the left, extreme dissatisfaction with US security policy, and despair over the feasibility of an independent West European defense.

A general shift to the left in Western Europe would also be necessary for the emergence of a "third force," an option involving reorienting European security policies to counter both superpowers. This option—based on the assumption that the United States and the Soviet Union will not indefinitely retain their primacy in European affairs—is more plausible than "Finlandization," especially if the Italian Communist Party enters the government and provides "third force" leadership.

Under all conceivable options, the West Europeans will continue to seek better relations with Eastern Europe. Some will hope that the East Europeans, sharing the West European interest in detente and economic interdependence, can become at least slightly more independent of Moscow, thus leading to a more general remodeling of European security.

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Contents

25X1

NATO: Adjusting the Alliance From Consultation to Negotiation

25X1

Shifting Assumptions and Relationships

The arms control and weapons modernization problems facing NATO may be the first signs of a process that will culminate in a significant readjustment of the US–West European security relationship. The three fundamental assumptions on which NATO is based—US economic and military preeminence, close identity of US and West European interests in the NATO area, and an unambiguous Soviet threat to Western Europe—are increasingly being questioned. Although the allies may worry that NATO as currently constituted no longer fits their security needs and capabilities, there is no consensus on an alternative.

The West European search for security takes place in the context of increasing doubts about US capabilities and intentions. The allies no longer believe that the United States is willing or able to conduct European detente politics in a manner that would lessen the impact of global tensions on European security, or with a view toward expanding regional detente. They resent what they perceive to be pressures to conform to US positions on Afghanistan without US efforts to protect Europe from the fallout of that crisis.

The West Europeans even question US will and ability to defend them against the Soviet Union. They have nearly as many doubts about the US strategic umbrella as they have about Washington's conduct of detente. Soviet-American strategic parity has sharpened the ever present European fear that the superpowers will use Europe as a battlefield while negotiating over their allies' heads in a last-ditch effort to exempt Soviet and American territory from destruction.

These twin fears—that the United States will either abandon detente or use Western Europe as a battleground—fuel allied interest in significantly expanding West European influence in NATO decisionmaking. The allies want to use NATO, long the symbol of US power, as a forum for constraining and shaping US initiatives. Therefore, although the West Europeans continue to support NATO, their perceptions of its functions are changing.

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At the very least the West Europeans will insist on having a greater voice in NATO decisionmaking than they have had in the past. During the Alliance's first 30 years, with the exception of the mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) talks, the most that the West Europeans—besides France—demanded was consultation before the United States announced crucial strategic decisions, whether involving force structure or arms control. Failure to consult adequately was a cause of allied complaint more often than disagreement with US policy.

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Consultation is still an allied demand, but the West Europeans are increasingly likely to question the assumptions behind US initiatives and increasingly doubtful that they reflect West European needs. The West Europeans still look to Washington for most major NATO policy initiatives, and differences between them almost always preclude a united front against Washington. But it is doubtful that the West Europeans will grant the United States the latitude it previously had in strategic decisionmaking.

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The allies do not believe that larger West European contributions to NATO policy necessarily mean a diminution of US preeminence. Rather, they believe that a greater West European role is the best way to achieve improved Alliance policies and the only way to assure their increasingly critical parliaments and publics that continued membership in NATO is in each country's interest. If NATO institutions are to retain West European confidence, they will have to serve as an effective vehicle for the allies to conduct multilateral negotiations, rather than simple consultations.

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This development stems as much from West European strength relative to the United States as from allied perceptions of US weakness. Divergent political interests have been a byproduct of time and West Eu-

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ropean economic resurgence. The generation coming to political maturity does not remember well the period of dependence on the United States, only the strains of the recent past. Although the allies are grateful for the massive US help extended for their economic recovery, they are determined to protect and expand that prosperity, even if their policies run counter to US preferences. In addition, although Western Europe's postwar economic recovery was spurred by American capital, its continued prosperity depends on Middle Eastern oil and a variety of other raw materials available mainly in the Third World.

Even if the US Government wanted to regain its political influence in Europe, its economic leverage would be inadequate to do so. The allies simply are not as economically or politically dependent on the United States as they once were. Non-European political and economic problems involving basic European security interests lie behind the West European insistence that the United States take their concerns into account before coming to policy decisions.

Nevertheless, the allies have not translated their economic strength into the military power that would be required to make them independent of the United States on security issues. They would be likely to do so only if they perceived a drastic reduction in US power or found US policy so inimical to their interests that it seemed a threat, rather than an addition to their security.

Detente

Allied efforts to adjust to their new, more equal relationship with the United States are colored by their overriding determination to save detente. Most West Europeans view detente as a safety valve in East-West relations; a few hope that it is a step toward a permanent reduction in European tensions. No one argues that there is an acceptable alternative to it. While agreeing with the United States that the Alliance must respond forcefully to the Soviet military buildup, West Europeans are torn between the options of strategic military modernization and arms control initiatives. For most of them the latter is a prerequisite to the former, not the other way around. The allies thus proceed with nuclear modernization only on condition that NATO sincerely attempt to make the deployment of such weapons unnecessary. The "negotiation from strength" argument increasingly falls on deaf ears in Western Europe. 25X1

Detente with the East has convinced many West Europeans that, up to a point, economic leverage and political conciliation can have some influence in the struggle for political stability and economic interdependence. Many in Western Europe believe that the Soviets sincerely fear losing detente's benefits as much as the West Europeans fear being engulfed by a renewed superpower arms race. 25X1

Tensions in Europe were low in the 1970s; it might even be argued that the decade following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was the most stable—in terms of Europe's perception of the likelihood of war or economic catastrophe—since the late 1920s. Atlantic solidarity under the US nuclear umbrella fit nicely with European economic cooperation and with both Alliance and unilateral approaches to the East. European Communist parties reentered the mainstream of political discussion and often seemed to be more a headache for Moscow than for the West. The energy problem shook the West Europeans' sense of well-being, but neither it nor anything else prior to the Afghan crisis led to a sense that European security was endangered *immediately*. 25X1

There had been earlier periods of thaw in East-West relations, notably following Stalin's death and after Khrushchev's fall. These periods also witnessed arms control efforts, increased international cultural exchanges, and an expansion of economic ties. The most recent thaw, however, was by far the most extensive, the most formally structured, and the most durable. In 1973 the superpowers codified detente with an agreement that neither would use it to gain unilateral advantage and that superpower consultations in crisis situations would be automatic (this latter point led the West Europeans to seek reassurances that Alliance consultation would not be reduced). 25X1

A further crucial distinction between earlier thaws and detente in the 1970s was the extent to which relations improved between the two halves of Europe. The *Ostpolitik* pursued by Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, unlike earlier efforts, produced numerous

specific agreements within a general perception of growing interdependence. Although bilateral agreements such as SALT I and SALT II grew out of earlier superpower negotiations, the complex and significant MBFR and CSCE processes became possible only after West Germany accepted the post–World War II territorial status quo.

The Europeans' stake in detente is now greater than ever, and they will play a more important role in determining the evolution of the process. At the same time, Europe continues to be the prime theater of superpower confrontation, and it is as true as ever that the state of Soviet-American relations is the barometer of what is possible in the East-West dialogue. The allies will attempt to influence this relationship by shifting emphasis on either part of the arms control/modernization equation, depending on which superpower they believe needs prodding toward detente. They will accept the principle of military modernization if satisfied with US strategic arms control policy or distressed with the Soviet arms buildup. Even in this case, however, the allies will continue to work for arms control progress in all security forums.

The Polish situation has underscored the Europeans' sense of living in the arena of superpower competition. They can do little to prevent a Soviet invasion; they can only hope that Poland can settle its difficulties without one. In the meantime, the allies have been careful to minimize their support—especially public support—for Polish liberalization.

The West Europeans view Soviet reaction to the emerging pluralism in Poland as a test of Moscow's willingness to refrain from force in order to expand areas of common interest with the West. An invasion would present the West Europeans with a dilemma because the Soviets would have seriously damaged a detente process that the allies valued.

The West Europeans would nonetheless attempt to maintain their arms control policies and keep open lines of communication with the East, but would have a harder time deflecting US pressure for greater defense efforts. The West Europeans probably would seek gradual normalization of relations with the USSR, as they—and the United States—did after Czechoslovakia; but the temper of US–Soviet relations and the momentum of both superpowers' arms programs probably would make it more difficult to find an early basis for mutually advantageous negotiations, especially given the decline of the SALT and MBFR arms control forums. Nevertheless, the West Europeans would still look to the arms control process, continuing to believe that both superpowers have a basic interest in arms control. 25X1

Arms Control 25X1

West European leverage on the NATO arms control position is increasing and represents the West European answer to steady US pressure for greater allied defense contributions. As long as arms control seemed to be proceeding smoothly, the allies could comfortably deflect pressure to counter Soviet military expenditures with the argument that arms control negotiations offered a real hope of rolling them back. The freeze in arms control progress, by threatening this equilibrium, did not result in a shift to military modernization efforts—especially in the area of theater nuclear forces—but rather to a frantic search to restore momentum to the arms control process. 25X1

Although West Europeans see a number of economic, social, and political advantages in detente, arms control remains its underpinning. The West Europeans believe that further improvements across the range of East-West issues largely depend on restoring the momentum to the arms control process—and SALT is the centerpiece of arms control. SALT deals with central strategic issues and has accomplished more than other arms control negotiations. 25X1

SALT. The West Europeans' concern with SALT has changed its focus in the past year or two. They long were concerned that progress in superpower negotiations was not being matched by successful European arms control agreements. In 1979, when the NATO Special Group established the Alliance's position on theater nuclear arms control, the West Europeans insisted that theater and central system talks be linked within SALT III, lest the superpowers bury European security questions in another bilateral deal. The allies made clear that SALT III would be negotiated first between the United States and its allies, then between the United States—speaking for NATO—and the USSR. 25X1 25X1

Difficulties with the ratification of the SALT II agreement produced a new overriding worry—that arms control, and therefore detente, might die. The West Europeans are now more willing to proceed with theater nuclear arms control in advance of the intercontinental aspects of the ensuing SALT process. Rather than being the "gray area" of SALT, theater nuclear negotiations might temporarily become its core.

This line of thought was strengthened by the Soviets' willingness to discuss procedural arrangements for theater weapons talks without SALT II being ratified or without last December's NATO decision to modernize long-range theater nuclear forces being reversed. The West Europeans are pleased by the Soviet initiative and by the willingness of both superpowers to discuss such talks without any agreement on whether to include so-called forward based systems (FBS). As long as the allies believe that neither Moscow nor Washington will make FBS agreement a precondition for the negotiations, they will not press either superpower to offer concessions on this issue. Should the FBS issue threaten to scuttle the talks, however, the West Europeans may reevaluate their longstanding opposition to the inclusion of FBS in SALT, although they probably will insist that the Soviets agree to include comparable aircraft in the negotiations.

The apparent death of SALT II in its present form assures a continued West European focus on the Geneva theater nuclear talks and defines the first West European test of the new US administration's arms control intentions. The allies are quite open to a renegotiated SALT II or a SALT III framework based on the theater nuclear balance—if that proves acceptable to both superpowers—but they will be wary of changes in clauses protecting the transfer of weapons technology across the Atlantic and of extending the range limitations of deployed sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles.

A collapse of the SALT process would lead the West Europeans to reevaluate the central components of NATO modernization efforts (starting with theater nuclear forces). The allies would have difficulty either constructing a viable arms control alternative in the absence of SALT or countering Soviet propaganda stressing Washington's responsibility for the demise of SALT

CSCE. It is clear to the allies that significant SALT III progress is not possible before the Madrid CSCE review conference concludes next spring. Most West Europeans considered the previous review of the Helsinki Final Act, in Belgrade during the winter of 1977-78, a failure because human rights polemics prevented progress in other areas. In the present atmosphere they look to Madrid to keep the arms control process alive, and although not abandoning human rights objectives, they hope that this time security questions will dominate the discussion. 25X1 25X1

Unless there is an invasion of Poland, the CSCE process will continue after Madrid, no matter how serious the differences over human rights. Even if other security forums resume, interest in progress on CSCE-linked military confidence building measures probably ensures further review conferences and related negotiations. 25X1

Each of the CSCE baskets touches on European security questions. Basket I holds little in the way of arms control potential because its voluntary confidence building measures are not nearly so significant as SALT or suggested MBFR weapons and manpower reductions. At this stage the adoption of militarily significant mandatory measures at a post-Madrid disarmament conference is problematic. Basket II concentrates on expanding economic trade and contacts, perhaps reflecting the traditional economic belief that conflict is incompatible with commerce. Basket III in part expresses the hope that an expanding network of cultural and technological contacts can promote international comity. 25X1 25X1

Most West Europeans hope that the CSCE review will accommodate parallel Basket I and Basket III negotiations. Whether the review can allow progress in one area and stagnation in another depends on whether detente can be delimited functionally as well as geographically. 25X1 25X1

MBFR. The other major West European arms control negotiation, the mutual and balanced force reductions talks, is in the doldrums. Brezhnev's recent proposal on arms control included an offer to reduce Soviet forces in Central Europe by 20,000 men, if the United States would withdraw 13,000 of its forces. Moscow indicated 25X1

that it would not necessarily count the 20,000-man withdrawal already under way in East Germany as part of this program, although in practice it will. The Soviets also proposed that each participant agree to hold its forces below 50 percent of the total forces of its alliance in Central Europe.

This offer does not deal with the major longstanding MBFR roadblock, the question of how many troops the East has in Central Europe, and probably will not result in movement toward an agreement. Recent Soviet willingness to discuss so-called "associated measures" in the MBFR context also probably does not indicate significant movement toward an agreement. These measures closely resemble CSCE confidence building measures, except that they would be mandatory and would apply only to Central Europe. In the future, Moscow may try to trade discussion of mandatory measures in MBFR for Western acquiescence to weaker CBMs in the wider CSCE area.

Even if Moscow becomes more flexible on the associated measures, West Germany may still balk. Bonn has systematically moved militarily significant measures from MBFR into the CSCE context through its support of the French proposal for a post-Madrid conference dedicated to such measures. The West Germans favor the wider area covered in CSCE. They believe that MBFR restrictions would affect their armed forces more than those of any other country.

For Western Europe, SALT problems, MBFR deadlock, and CSCE dilemmas do not add up to an end to detente. Western Europe will maintain its political and economic stake in easing relations with the East no matter what happens to existing arms control talks. Even if the Polish crisis worsens the East-West atmosphere and makes revitalization of those forums extremely unlikely, the allies will probably continue to search for ways to break the arms control logjam.

Force Modernization

While arms control is temporarily halted, NATO military modernization is proceeding at an uneven pace. Problems caused by cumbersome Alliance consultation procedures and difficulty in reaching NATO modernization goals fuel dissatisfaction with the policy toward arms procurement and deployment.

The Alliance is attempting force modernization under the umbrella of the Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP), a comprehensive plan to improve NATO's military posture in 10 specific "task force" areas. Nine of these, including reserve mobilization, command, control, and communications and electronic warfare, call for progress through task force consideration of specific proposals. Each task force has a program monitor responsible for reporting progress or lack of it to NATO political authorities. The LTDP is to be financed partly—although not yet formally—through allied commitments to a 3-percent real annual increase in defense spending. Given disparate accounting methods, it is not clear which of the allies is fulfilling this goal, but most apparently have fallen short because of severe domestic political and economic constraints.

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In principle, the allies reacted favorably to US suggestions that the defense response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan should include acceleration of specific LTDP programs and national force goals. No one, however, proposed that the allies go beyond the LTDP. All seem to agree that an expanded defense effort is out of the question. Even this modest post-Afghanistan initiative faces problems, however, and it is still not clear which allies will honor which commitments.

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West Germany and the United Kingdom are modest exceptions. In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Bonn increased its defense spending by 1 billion marks this year, and the United Kingdom announced its intention to increase its presence East of Suez. Neither, however, will reach the 3-percent goal this year, primarily because of economic stringencies. The West Germans are aware this will make it easier for other allies to fall short of their commitments, but greatly resent the US pressure that has accompanied the West German defense debate.

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Progress toward achieving the 3-percent goal is even slower in the smaller allied countries, and it is unlikely that the West Europeans will accept any US requests for greater increases in allied defense spending. The Belgian defense budget for 1980 and 1981 will probably not be increased in real terms, seriously impairing Belgian defense capabilities. Belgian participation in

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the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) is doubtful, and its role as a basing state for long-range theater nuclear forces is questionable.

Denmark may also decrease real defense spending; the most optimistic forecasts are for no more than 2 percent real growth. In the Netherlands, economic stringencies appear to preclude 3-percent real growth in defense spending. Italy is unlikely to meet its NATO force goals. Turkey and Portugal, far from increasing their Alliance contributions, expect to receive more aid from their allies.

Theater nuclear force (TNF) modernization, originally the 10th LTDP task force, dwarfs the other aspects of modernization as a political and military issue, if not an economic one. For the West Europeans TNF means arms control as much as it does modernization and can proceed only if both processes are pursued. The West Europeans probably will insist that arms control be a critical component of all future allied modernization programs.

Theater nuclear discussions focus on long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF), weapons capable of making strategic strikes against the Soviet Union from bases in Western Europe. The LRTNF issue marks an enhancement of allied participation in nuclear decisions. The failure of the multilateral force idea in the 1960s did not destroy Alliance solidarity because US strategic superiority—and therefore NATO military credibility—remained intact even without MLF. That superiority no longer exists. Failure of the LRTNF program would raise serious questions about both the Alliance's security and its solidarity. LRTNF is an important test of the allies' ability to maintain both a credible deterrent and a more-or-less unified decisionmaking process.

The lag between the December 1979 declaration of intent to deploy and actual deployment, as well as the link between modernization and the SALT III process, ensures further NATO review of LRTNF in response to arms control progress and the evolution of views in the five basing countries (West Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands). France, although not actively involved in the LRTNF program, is perhaps its greatest West European proponent. Paris is concerned about the implications of an East-West military imbalance, has tacitly endorsed NATO's LRTNF modernization, and has embarked on a significant upgrading of its own nuclear forces (which qualify technically as TNF), including production of enhanced radiation warheads. 25X1 25X1

Other West Europeans are not eager to base new intermediate-range missiles on their soil, especially because US planners argue that the presence in Europe of these systems will significantly augment the US nuclear guarantee. The deterrent value of these land-based missiles rests on the notion that the Soviets assume the West would use them rather than allow them to be overrun in a conventional assault. 25X1 25X1

The Dutch and Belgians see these missiles as politically exposed, and thus as magnets for antinuclear demonstrations. Flemish Belgians fear that basing the missiles in Flanders will make the region a nuclear target while exempting Wallonia. The Dutch Government considers the weapons a potential focus for the country's significant and vocal antinuclear movement. 25X1 25X1

West Germany, the key LRTNF country, accepts deployment of the weapons, but only if at least one other continental state agrees to share basing responsibility (Italy satisfies that condition). Bonn is acutely aware of both allied and Warsaw Pact sensitivity to West German power and will want basing spread as evenly as possible. West Germany has repeatedly affirmed that it has no intention of becoming a nuclear power. 25X1

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Because the allies chose initially to concentrate on longer range theater nuclear systems, discussion of shorter range weapons that would be used largely on West German soil has been postponed. When shorter range TNF issues, such as the French and US "neutron bomb," come to the fore again, they will spark as much opposition from arms control proponents in West Germany as the long-range systems have in Belgium and the Netherlands. The West Germans, therefore, will have an interest in expanding TNF arms control negotiations to include discussions of shorter range systems. They may continue, for example, to stress the principle that MBFR reductions can include nuclear launcher systems, specifically Pershing I-A missile launchers. [redacted]

The other allies welcome NATO's impending review of its short- and medium-range TNF needs, as long as it is a comprehensive study that could allow for a reduction, instead of an increase, in Alliance nuclear inventories. The smaller allies will press for NATO to shift away from reliance on shorter range nuclear systems wherever a conventional replacement can be found. The Netherlands, in particular, probably will use the study as a vehicle to rationalize renunciation of at least some of its nuclear responsibilities [redacted]

The overall Alliance approach to force modernization is focused on specific LTDP structures, voluntary allied adherence to the suggestions of program monitors, and sporadic West European arms cooperation. The basic West European faith in detente and, more importantly, the severe economic constraints the West Europeans face sharply limit allied willingness and ability to meet—much less accelerate—LTDP goals. [redacted]

Although interallied disagreement on the defense response to the invasion of Afghanistan and on meeting the 3-percent goal underscore the weakness of the LTDP, no one has a feasible alternative to it as a framework for military modernization. Rather than seeking one, the West Europeans will continue to support the LTDP process, resisting measures that they believe they cannot fulfill. The best Washington can expect from its allies is sharp negotiations on implementation of LTDP measures and followup consultations once decisions on national defense spending are made. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

The Alliance Evolves

Despite their doubts about US leadership, it is most likely that the West Europeans, while increasing their role in strategic decisionmaking and in determining NATO's balance between force modernization and arms control, will find it easier to revitalize the American connection than to scuttle the North Atlantic Alliance. Doubts, suspicions, and worries about the United States are ultimately of less concern than the lack of a substitute for US strategic power in the foreseeable future. [redacted] 25X1

NATO is already undergoing structural changes designed to bring more balance into the partnership. The Alliance's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), to which originally only the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, and West Germany belonged permanently, now has been expanded to give permanent seats to all allies interested in taking part in determining NATO's nuclear policy. Although the NPG is likely to remain the main forum for discussing NATO-related nuclear issues, it will probably be increasingly supplemented by subgroups designed to deal with particular aspects. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

To handle the theater nuclear issue, a special High Level Group on force modernization was established under the NPG, and a Special Group on theater nuclear arms control was created outside the NPG structure. The Special Consultative Group (SCG) on theater nuclear arms control succeeded the Special Group and seeks to develop specific arms control strategy and tactics. Some allies hope to take advantage of the SCG's direct subordination to the North Atlantic Council, thus institutionalizing Alliance theater arms control coordination at the political level and perhaps permitting expansion of SCG jurisdiction to other arms control issues. [redacted] 25X1 25X1 25X1

The United Kingdom in particular hopes that the SCG will expand its responsibilities to include the entire range of SALT III issues. Other West Europeans may use the SCG to promote inclusion of forward-based systems in NATO's theater nuclear negotiating package. No matter what the future of the SALT process, the West Europeans may want something like the SCG as a forum for negotiations between the United States and its allies on strategic questions.

France, while accepting the need for arms control and pushing for allied acceptance of its concept of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe, may balk at close NATO coordination of security policies. Paris refuses to put its strategic systems on the SALT table or to participate fully in Alliance SALT III preparations, although it sends a representative to selected meetings dealing with these topics. Paris fears that inclusion of its relatively modest force in a negotiation dominated by the superpowers would undermine the credibility of its independent deterrent. It is doubtful that France will increase its formal Alliance ties, but a greater West European role in NATO policy formation would improve chances for informal cooperation.

A more influential West European political role in NATO will not in itself resolve the Alliance's difficulties. Disputes between large and small states, debates about the emphasis to be put on arms control as opposed to modernization, and other basic problems probably will remain important regardless of the forum in which they are discussed. In addition, West European countries will need to redefine their military contribution to the Alliance. That redefinition will not depend on the LTDP or the 3-percent pledge, but on domestic perceptions of the US commitment, the Soviet threat, how much a country believes it can afford to spend, and how leaders balance their and their constituents' preferences for arms control and force modernization.

One option some West Europeans have considered is an effective conventional deterrent linked to US nuclear guarantees by a continued US troop presence on the continent. The West Europeans would build up a defense capable of forcing the Soviets to a military standoff or of even taking the offensive, and US forces would constitute a far smaller percentage of NATO's conventional defense than at present. This scenario assumes West European faith in US intentions to use nuclear weapons should deterrence fail, a clear separation between conventional and nuclear war, and US willingness to leave some troops on the continent once West European defenses are built up. The West Europeans—especially the West Germans—would also have to believe that the war could be carried East, or at least contained, so as to prevent unacceptable damage in Western Europe.

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The financial costs and domestic antimilitary sentiment would probably keep the smaller states from augmenting their military forces to contribute to such a deterrent. On the other hand, they would resist a force composed mainly of troops from the larger states, if only because of their continuing suspicion of West German power. Bonn is aware of how little its neighbors trust West German military might and is unlikely to proceed with a massive conventional buildup without general West European support.

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The well-known sensitivity of the smaller states about conclaves of their larger brethren makes repetition of the "directorate" atmosphere of the Guadeloupe Conference in January 1979 doubtful in either a European or an Atlantic setting, although France for one will continue to prefer it. Italy, left out of Guadeloupe, will demand greater political status as a price for its willingness to base LRTNF and would press for enhanced political influence in return for its agreement to a strengthened West European conventional force. The smaller states are likely to show an increased inclination to resist the positions of the larger states, particularly if they believe that their interest in arms control is not adequately shared by their neighbors.

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In addition, increased West European political and military responsibility may bring with it a renewal of traditional political differences. National rivalries, now relatively quiescent, could become important again in a resurgent Western Europe. Franco–West German relations—presently aided by the close personal ties between Schmidt and Giscard—would be the key factor, particularly if a premature reduction of the US presence in Europe leaves these old enemies with sudden responsibility for European security. Smoldering ethnic disputes in many West European states could complicate this process.

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A greater West European role in NATO will also raise the issue of a geographic division of labor in starker terms than before. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has already sharpened debate on the question. The Alliance was created when Europe was the primary theater of the Cold War and the United States the only member with global—as opposed to colonial—power and responsibilities. Now Alliance strategic and economic interests in the Third World are more vital and more disparate than before, and West European confidence in US willingness and ability to protect political interests and access to raw materials has greatly diminished.

The West Europeans are capable of assuming more political and military responsibility in the Third World, but probably only by reducing force modernization efforts in Europe. In choosing a formula for an Alliance division of labor, governments on both sides of the Atlantic will have to deal with emerging differences between the United States and its allies on Third World as well as European affairs and will have to examine carefully the costs such a division of labor entails.

West European governments, except possibly the British, believe that detente is divisible. They hope, in the short run, to insulate European security as much as possible from the crisis in Southwest Asia. The NATO response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan indicates the difficulty a more balanced alliance will have in dealing with a division of labor. The allies probably will continue to reject efforts to expand formally NATO's responsibilities to include protection of areas outside the North Atlantic area. Britain and France seem likely to increase their roles in the Persian Gulf–Indian Ocean area, but they will do this unilaterally. The West Europeans almost certainly will reject the suggestion that NATO create an intervention force designed to protect Western access to oil producing areas.

The Western reaction to the Iran-Iraq war probably illustrates the level of allied cooperation possible in areas of the Third World rich in raw materials. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France have made ad hoc military arrangements to keep open the Strait of Hormuz and protect Western access to Persian Gulf oil, while continuing to pursue different—even contradictory—political strategies. France would have continued to supply Iraq with weapons even if the United States and Iran had agreed to exchange weapons for hostages. No formal Alliance role in the crisis was possible. Allied military reliance on the United States in vital Third World areas is not matched by a willingness to conform to American approaches to global tensions; the West Europeans count on Washington's willingness to provide basic military protection without requiring general political coordination.

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Alternatives to Alliance

For all its shortcomings, NATO is the focus for West European security efforts and is likely to continue in this role for the foreseeable future. The US nuclear guarantee probably will continue to be essential, and the West Europeans probably will continue to share enough basic political values with the United States—along with a sense of the threat from the Soviet Union—to ensure that all parties in the transatlantic relationship seek to adjust NATO's machinery rather than abandon it in favor of a completely new security arrangement.

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Nevertheless, under certain circumstances, the allies could look for a new arrangement. If they should come to believe that the United States was becoming so weak militarily that it could not carry out its security responsibilities, they might feel a need to devise a replacement for the US umbrella. On the other hand, if US–West European policy disputes should escalate into disagreements over basic political values, the allies might reexamine their assumptions about superpower threats to European security.

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Even if the West Europeans attempt to reorient their security policies, however, they would not easily find a replacement for the remarkably durable North Atlantic Treaty. The following options, therefore, not only are unlikely compared to the prospects for an adjusted Alliance, but would face significant obstacles even if the West Europeans first decided to jettison the NATO framework.

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Unity

If the allies seriously doubted Washington's willingness to use its power to protect basic West European interests, or at the other extreme, if they believed the United States was moving toward a policy of gratuitous confrontation with the USSR, the West Europeans might consider an attempt to submerge their political differences for the sake of common regional and global concerns. Regional unity might seem to provide a logical answer to West European fears of being caught in a fight between the superpowers because a United States of Europe would have the potential of becoming a power competitive with the United States and USSR.

A federal Europe is unlikely, however, for the foreseeable future. The appeal of competing on an equal basis with untrustworthy superpowers cannot overcome traditional national sentiments and fears of West German hegemony. The limits of political integration also restrict the chances that the European allies can assume neutrality between the superpowers. Because the Soviet Union might be as alarmed about an independent Western Europe as the United States is, movement in that direction might exacerbate European tension rather than dispel it.

Confederation seems a more promising alternative for those West Europeans who seek some level of regional military cooperation but recognize the limited prospects for political integration. A confederal approach would involve assigning specific security functions to a common institution with limited political responsibility. States would not surrender sovereignty over political decisions, but would merely create an institution to carry out common programs agreed to by political authorities.

In a partial move in that direction, West Europeans increasingly are discussing political and security policy within the EC as well as within NATO. The former is somewhat removed from US influence, and the latter is not well equipped to deal with the growing interdependence of economic and security questions. The mixed results of recent NATO modernization programs have contributed to the attention given the Community as an alternative forum for policy coordination. In addition, the EC directly institutionalizes European economic potential, so much a part of the shifting transatlantic relationship. The Community is likely to become more involved in West European policy coordination on issues such as the Middle East that involve significant differences with the United States.

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Community members might increasingly use the EC as a tool for security cooperation. The 1978 Klepsch report [1] provides philosophical support for an expanded role for the Community in security affairs. If the Community can expand economic cooperation into arms production, greater coordination of West European weapons philosophies and strategic doctrine might be possible.

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This scenario, however, faces serious obstacles. West Europeans have significant differences over preferred missions and configurations of weapons systems as well as over foreign policy. The distribution of the economic benefits of arms production—contracts, jobs, and basing awards—would be a major point of contention.

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Overall, chances are remote that the West Europeans will be able to build the common political institutions that would make a West European alternative to NATO feasible. The French would probably block any attempt to turn EC security consultations into a formal mechanism for automatic coordination or consultations on political initiatives. Moreover, most governments probably would prefer to be at least as far removed from their neighbors' policies as from those of the United States.

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Cooperation

If the West Europeans considered political integration unlikely or unnecessary, yet still wanted to limit their military dependence on the United States, they could attempt more limited forms of military cooperation.

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On the surface it would seem that the failure of the US–West European "two-way street" in arms sales should provide impetus for cooperation between West

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[1] This report, submitted by Egon Klepsch, a West German member of the European Parliament, concluded that the EC needed to address armaments production as part of its common industrial policy.

European states on specific projects. Alleged US disregard of its pledges to procure the Franco–West German Roland missile and slowness in buying a West German 120-millimeter gun for the XM-1 tank are the latest examples of the "two-way-street" problem. West Europeans, however, differ among themselves as much as they do with the United States on these issues. In the vital area of tactical aircraft, for example, West European cooperation is impeded by differing national priorities over which mission a new aircraft should serve (ground attack, deep interdiction, air superiority). One answer to the problem, the multirole combat aircraft Tornado, performs several missions relatively inefficiently rather than any one well.

Nevertheless, a variety of economic and political motives probably will inspire continued endeavors at specifically European defense cooperation. Efforts in air-to-air missiles, antitank weapons, and a light attack training aircraft provide excellent opportunities for collaboration. Defense cooperation will probably accelerate in other areas where the West Europeans agree on the necessity and mission of a system.

The Problem of a European Deterrent

These incremental developments in conventional weapons themselves cannot provide more than a supplement to US strategic power in Europe. Western Europe would face a dilemma should it decide to adopt a really strong, independent nuclear—or even conventional—deterrent. A European deterrent would take time to construct; during the transition Western Europe could not claim to have either protection by the United States or effective protection with its own resources from the USSR.

Reliance on a conventional deterrent would mean that the US strategic umbrella remained crucial just when West European arms developments were challenging the credibility of US protection. The United States, if convinced that its allies were ready to take over the conventional stages of deterrence and controlled escalation, might pull its troops out of Europe. This in turn would strengthen a premature impression that Western Europe was on its own. To prevent such problems, the United States and Western Europe might formally agree to phase out reliance on the nuclear umbrella over a specific period while Western Europe conducted a nuclear buildup. In order to save time and money, some allies might even consider purchasing cruise and ballistic missile technology from the United States. Although this scenario might ease fears of a premature US–West European separation, it might also highlight French refusal to accept US technology in contrast to the other allies. It also might raise problems in arms control forums, as a purely bilateral SALT process might no longer be feasible. Meanwhile, during the transition, the physical credibility of US power would remain important, and West European doubts that the Americans would use it would persist.

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A less formal—and more conceivable—route would involve gradually increasing British and French cooperation in upgrading national nuclear forces. Britain would continue to insist on its "special relationship" with the United States, and France would restate its independence. In the first few years little formal coordination would be required, merely consultations with nonnuclear allies aimed at convincing them that West European nuclear weapons were becoming an increasingly important part of Western deterrence strategy. Later, assuming continued interest in nuclear force modernization, the two powers might collaborate on specific systems, perhaps a submarine for the later 1990s.

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Although such cooperation has been ruled out by the present British Government through its decision to purchase the Trident, it would become more plausible if perceptions of US decline and Soviet aggressiveness grew in Europe. Significant problems relating to the United Kingdom's use of American technology, technical difficulties in setting up such an operation, and residual political differences would still have to be worked out. The timing and procedure of a transfer of responsibility from the US would also be problematic.

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A Franco-British deterrent, if successfully constructed, would make strategic credibility a European problem rather than an Atlantic one. Would nonnuclear West European states believe that Britain and France would defend them more readily than the United States? Would the proximity of the two powers ensure their reliability? Some Europeans undoubtedly would remember Franco-British behavior in the 1930s.

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An even less likely option would be a Franco–West German nuclear force. The specter of West German nuclear weapons would alarm not only the Soviets, but most other Europeans as well, especially if US–West German ties were greatly loosened.

The direction of French defense policy, however, clearly allows for closer nuclear coordination with West Germany. The test of an enhanced radiation weapon (the so-called "neutron bomb") underscores French movement toward a commitment to battlefield use of nuclear weapons. Bonn is aware that this implies a forward defense of France, and the closer France gets to a forward defense doctrine, the more pressing is the need for closer Franco–West German military coordination. Still, it is highly unlikely that France—or any other West European country—will drop opposition to a formal West German role in the determination of French nuclear targeting and employment doctrine.

The Schmidt-Giscard meeting in July demonstrated that West Germany and France are aware of the need for closer security cooperation and that they are only in the early stages of negotiating structures for its implementation. French calls for an independent Europe were countered by Schmidt's reminder that Bonn is inextricably tied to the Atlantic Alliance.

Schmidt realizes he has the opportunity to use the change in French strategy to encourage closer French cooperation with NATO as a whole, not just with West Germany. Bonn will hope for cooperation from Washington on this matter. If the West Germans believe that the United States understands the role of Franco–West German relations in the context of NATO's overall adjustment, they will be more confident of eventual policy success. France, in short, cannot lure West Germany from its NATO ties; the opposite is more likely to happen unless Bonn believes that Washington is being inflexible about Alliance adjustments in general or France's relationship to NATO's military organization in particular.

The possibility of a Franco–West German condominium in Europe, therefore, is yet another factor working for, not against, an adjusted Alliance. Smaller states are likely to look at too close a relationship between Bonn and Paris as a threat to the equitable distribution in Western Europe of authority over security decisionmaking. While all West Europeans are committed to arms control, smaller states are less interested than their larger neighbors in nuclear force modernization. Thus, NATO would look attractive to smaller states in search of institutional protection against domination by the large states. This will be the case, however, only if these allies perceive that the United States sincerely encourages a more equitable distribution of political responsibility in the Alliance.

For their part, the larger states might resent smaller state preoccupation with arms control should it spill over into their own domestic political arenas. Chancellor Schmidt in particular must cope with influence on his party's left wing by socialists in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia. NATO might serve large states as a forum for public exploration of the rationale for force modernization, as well as a reminder of the Soviet threat on which it is based. The apparent concurrence between the United States and France on the need for theater nuclear modernization might also become a powerful stimulant to an adjusted French relationship to the Alliance.

Perhaps the bleakest conceivable scenario would be a complete breakdown of West European efforts to fashion a replacement for the US umbrella. Even if NATO were perceived as increasingly useless, the pressure driving the allies away from the United States probably would not be enough to produce a feasible alternative.

If the allies found that they could not guarantee their own security either in cooperation with the United States or on their own, a sense of despair might set in that could seriously jeopardize the future of European security. This scenario would leave Western Europe without any sense of direction or much hope of finding one. It could produce a de facto "Finlandization" of Western Europe, with the allies surrendering their independence by default, rather than through an active policy.

Finlandization

A more active choice in favor of "Finlandization" might be made should leftwing and pacifist opposition

forces gain broader public appeal than they have currently. Neutralization still would not be possible, given continued obstacles to West European political and military integration. But the West Europeans might find the Finnish model—as they perceive it—attractive if they grew significantly more concerned about US indecisiveness, vacillation, or on the other hand, inflexibility on certain arms control questions, but were unwilling to consider an active European defense alternative.

Although "Finlandization" is not a likely option for NATO's members, it would be most conceivable for the smaller allies. The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway are opposed, in varying degrees, to theater nuclear modernization and to the LTDP stress on military readiness rather than on arms reduction.

"Finlandization," in this context, would mean that the security policies of West European governments would become responsive to Soviet interests. In return for "peace"—security from the danger of war beyond that offered by detente—the Soviet Union would have a say in West European security policy. If the Italian Communists renounced their support of NATO, the leading West European Communist parties might become the nucleus of West European support for this option; their positions on foreign and defense issues often (but not always) coincide with Soviet policy, while their domestic "roads to 'Socialism' " are relatively autonomous. Each state would maintain a small defense force and would speak out often against interventionism, while tailoring its foreign policy to avoid challenging Moscow.

A West European version of "Finlandization," however, would differ from the Finnish model in one important respect. The Soviet concern with Finland is based partly on the latter's demonstrated willingness to resist direct Soviet assaults on its sovereignty. In other words, the Finnish threat to Moscow is to some extent the motor of "Finlandization," not the other way around. In this scenario, however, it is likely that the West Europeans would show less will than have the Finns to protect their vital security interests. The West European version of "Finlandization" would be closer to the use of the term as an epithet than to the actual Finnish case. Therefore, aside from the latent threat that Moscow perceives from West Germany, Soviet interest in "Finlandizing" the allies stems from a perception of opportunity, rather than concern for their own security. Moscow also can hope to gain increasing leverage over countries that have a decreasing interest in defending themselves. 25X1

A Soviet invasion of Poland would shake—but not necessarily destroy—the rationale for this approach. 25X1
Over the short run, an invasion in reaction to Polish internal developments would seriously challenge the Finlandizers' faith in their ability to remain autonomous from Moscow at the same time as they tie their security to it. On the other hand, some West Europeans might despair at their inability to prevent such Soviet actions—against themselves as well as the Poles—and search for new ways to accommodate overwhelming 25X1
Soviet power. For others, in time, the memory of Poland might slowly fade as did that of Czechoslovakia, leading to renewed interest in the Soviet blandishments that are certain to follow a period of postinvasion tension

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"Finlandization" could be institutionalized through a series of agreements between the Soviets and Western Europe. A first step might be West European acceptance of Soviet-sponsored declaratory confidence building measures involving statements of peaceful intent. The Soviets might then push for a nonaggression pact or a new European security treaty. NATO, and perhaps the Warsaw Pact, might be discarded in favor of a web of bilateral agreements weighted in favor of Soviet power. 25X1

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A milder version of "Finlandization"—or an advanced version of *Ostpolitik*—would involve a simple readjustment of West European foreign policies. The Soviet role in Europe would expand as US power receded. Economic ties between the European Community and the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance probably would expand. The genesis of such a rapprochement might be a Soviet–West German agreement expanding *Ostpolitik* in exchange for promises of eventual German reunification. 25X1

"Finlandization" is highly unlikely, at least for the foreseeable future. The West Europeans have no desire to trade superpowers and would do so only if the balance of forces, or direction of US policy, leaves them no choice.

The Third Force

A more likely scenario than "Finlandization" would involve emergence of a West European "third force" that saw a security threat from both the United States and the Soviet Union and tried to defuse it through arms control. The "third force" idea is based on several assumptions, the most important of which is that the superpowers will not indefinitely retain their primacy in European affairs.

While NATO backers urge renewed ties to the United States (if under new negotiating principles), and future West European "Finlandizers" would be resigned to Soviet hegemony, "third force" advocates would urge a more assertive and independent Western Europe acting to protect itself from both giants. The "third force" is the ideological reverse of European deterrent advocacy. Rather than suggesting a West European military buildup as a step toward greater political influence, "third force" advocates support arms control and disarmament efforts to limit the threat to European security.

Unlike "Finlandizers," they would not find a Soviet invasion of Poland a cause for despair. While they would condemn it and bemoan the chances for early liberalization in the Warsaw Pact, they would argue that the Polish desire for liberalization, coupled with continuing differences between the United States and Western Europe, demonstrates the inevitability of eventual European movement away from both superpowers. Like all West Europeans, "third force" advocates would scramble to find a new basis for the East-West relationship. No matter what happens in Poland, however, "third force" partisans will continue to seek ties with East Europeans who agree that European security can best be guaranteed by diminishing superpower domination of regional affairs as much as possible.

The Italian Communist Party (PCI) and others with "third force" sympathies are concerned that the superpowers might draw Western Europe into worldwide tensions resulting from the US-Soviet rivalry. Although they admit that Soviet military developments and foreign deployments are regrettable and dangerous, they believe that such manifestations are a reaction to Western hostility, rather than a sign of aggressive intent or operation according to the canons of Marxism-Leninism. According to this reasoning, West Europeans must find a way to live with the USSR, rather than seek to confront it. 25X1 25X1

This does not mean that the "third force" would work against existing military blocs in the short run. The PCI accepts NATO as a necessary counterweight to potential Soviet aggression. It views the possibility of a Soviet attack on Western Europe as a calculable, if remote, possibility. While it will continue to stress the importance of arms control, it will not rule out a Western arms buildup as a last resort. An invasion of Poland would increase the likelihood of "third force" support for West European arms modernization. The PCI, however, differentiates between NATO as a European security apparatus and as a tool of US "imperialism." The PCI, should it join an Italian government, would work within NATO as a critical partner, wary of US initiatives and creative in its use of Alliance machinery to offset American influence. 25X1 25X1

The best chance for "third force" success lies in some form of cooperation between the PCI and West European socialists. This would require a definite move to the left by either the French or West German socialists, probably as a result of dissatisfaction with US arms control positions or because of the rise of younger, less pro-US leaders. While some socialists might argue that the "third force" concept offers a chance for integrating European leftists into the mainstream of European security discussions, it is clear that these forces would bring to the debate firm intentions to bend future security strategies to accord with their views of the preferred direction of Western defense doctrine. 25X1

The other conceivable "third force" scenario would involve PCI assumption—or sharing—of power, perhaps at the same time that alternative centers of power grow in Eastern Europe (Polish trade unions, for example). These forces, watched with great concern and hostility by the superpowers, would feed on each oth- 25X1

er's existence. In any case, any "third force" evolution is likely to bother the Soviets, as they anxiously watch Hungarian, Polish, and other East European reaction, at least as much as it would bother the United States. Moscow's reaction to Polish tensions may prove a guide to its willingness to tolerate such developments.

Relations With Eastern Europe

Some see the restoration of the military balance and integration of West European leftists into the European security mainstream as two sides of the same coin, leading to a broad consensus on European security not just within Western Europe but in Eastern Europe as well. Although few West Europeans are utopian enough to believe that greater participation by the West European left in NATO security discussions will cause parallel ideological debates in the Warsaw Pact, some social democrats, socialists, and West European Communists, should they come to power, would press for a major reassessment of West European security needs, including a reorientation of West European relations with at least Hungary, and perhaps Poland, if it is not invaded.

Under each option analyzed in this paper, from NATO adjustment to "Finlandization," West Europeans will continue to put great emphasis on improved relations with Eastern Europe. Most West European governments, while not looking for East–West European convergence, agree that one of the primary benefits of detente has been the improvement in relations with Eastern Europe—a benefit that they would hope to preserve even if the Soviets invaded Poland. The last decade has marked an effort to establish—perhaps for the first time in history—a common European political and security system based on equal status for East European states. Both halves of Europe are engaged in a struggle to become more independent of the superpowers, and now that Western Europe can claim some progress in this regard, some allies will look East for even a hint of movement in the same direction, despite the differences between the two situations.

In this context, an adjustment may come between Alliances, not just within NATO. It would be based on shared East and West European concern over the behavior of their respective superpowers and on increasing regional economic interdependence. Convergence is improbable, and escape from superpower rivalry is impossible. Western Europe, however, which specifically rejected sanctions against Eastern Europe in the wake of Afghanistan, will continue to pursue improvements in its relations with the East, even in the event of an invasion of Poland, aware that the East Europeans are more securely tied to the USSR than is Western Europe to the United States. It will take more than trade and ideological erosion to loosen Warsaw Pact ties, but both halves of Europe may find coincident interests in controlling superpower competition through regular bilateral or European-wide consultations, to the extent that the US and USSR tolerate such a process—and even the Soviets could hardly avoid a degree of tolerance. 25X1

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A byproduct of better East–West European relations is the growing West European interest in the stability of the East European regimes. It is doubtful that the West Europeans would support attempts to "roll back" Communist domination of Eastern Europe; allied interest in their ties to the East—and in avoiding the disaster that would result from chaos there—may induce ever greater efforts to shore up East European economies and political structures.

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Even before Poland's political situation became acute, Western Europe was interested in helping Warsaw resolve its economic problems. In particular, West Germany, perhaps with the most at stake in its relations with the East, and certainly in the best position of the West Europeans to offer financial help, still appears ready to aid the Poles—assuming there is no invasion.

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The West Europeans gamble that their acceptance of Europe's territorial status quo and their willingness to assist in maintaining stability in Eastern Europe reduces the Soviet need to use force in Poland. The allies will also try to avoid provocative actions that might increase that need, but will have a hard time preventing such irritants as donations by Western labor unions to the new Polish labor organization, Solidarity.

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An invasion of Poland would undercut many of the assumptions of the last 12 years in European politics. Specifically, it would drastically set back progress in inter-European relations and challenge the domestic political consensus on the benefits of detente in many

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West European states. In West Germany, in particular, the assumptions of *Ostpolitik* would come under fire, as would the assumption that economic ties between Bonn and the East have the political benefits Willy Brandt hoped—and some Soviets feared—they would.

The German question will be at the center of European politics no matter what the fate of detente. Germany remains both the potential flashpoint of East-West relations and the central theater of detente. The special status of Berlin underscores the reciprocal relationship between inter-German relations and the overall European security balance. The East German Government is extremely unsure of its survival and is particularly afraid that a liberalized Poland might fatally infect its "socialist" system. By immediately taking out its fears on inter-German relations—through new currency restrictions, restrictions on movement by journalists in East Germany, and vitriolic anti-Bonn rhetoric—East Germany reminded Bonn that the painful process of inter-German normalization cannot be insulated from Polish developments any more than it can from the larger European security picture.

Although both German states are acutely aware of the international dimension of their relationship, the "domestic" focus of the arbitrary division of their country continues to dominate the approaches of both states to wider questions of European security. No West German politician can renounce the goal of eventual German unity. Although the East German leadership has done so, it is aware that much of its constituency looks toward reunification

It is unlikely that German unity can result from such feelings, unless perceptions of US weakness are combined with a breakdown of the East European security system. It is clear that the USSR is able to use pan-German lures in its response to *Ostpolitik*, but Moscow—especially if Poland becomes more independent—may have a hard time constraining future bursts of German nationalism on both sides of the Berlin Wall.

Conclusions

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the stalling of the SALT process, and problems in Poland have severely shaken the detente that has been the basis for European security over the past 12 years. The first of these crises led to a momentary sense of allied unity that was largely dissipated by the time of the Moscow Olympics and did not diminish basic US–West European differences. The second problem exacerbated those differences by underscoring transatlantic disagreements over the relationship between arms control and modernization. An invasion of Poland, while probably leading to greater Alliance solidarity and perhaps even to incremental increases in weapons programs, would not nullify domestic constraints on those programs or reverse West European interest in eventual rejuvenation of the arms control process. 25X1

This is not the first time that there has been a crisis in the transatlantic relationship. Every few years some controversy—Korea, German rearmament, Berlin, MLF, Vietnam—causes West Europeans to reassess the US role in European security. The difference this time is that the latest transatlantic dispute involves a basic realignment of capability as well as of policy. US-Soviet strategic parity and West European economic recovery force allies on both sides of the Atlantic to come to grips with the costs and benefits of detente and with the declining military position of the West relative to the Warsaw Pact. 25X1

In addition, NATO must consider the role of a seemingly stable Western Europe in a distressingly volatile world. NATO's responsibilities were defined when Europe seemed to be all that mattered to North Atlantic security. That is no longer the case, and individual allies and the 10-member European Community clearly will increase their responsibilities in the Third World, perhaps at cross-purposes with both US and Soviet foreign policy. 25X1

Both detente and good relations with developing states are necessities for most West Europeans. Alliance solidarity will prove even harder to maintain if resource dependency and fear of a new arms race continue to dominate West European perceptions of international politics. The force modernization–arms control debate probably is a prototype of future NATO problems and shows that negotiations are necessary before NATO can issue even statements on areas of common concern. 25X1

SALT III and other future negotiations will consist of negotiations first between the United States and the West Europeans and then between the US—speaking for the Alliance—and the USSR. Although SALT probably will not evolve into a bloc-to-bloc negotiation like MBFR, it is possible that the same sort of protracted Alliance squabbling inherent in the MBFR process will complicate SALT as well. 25X1

NATO will attempt to adjust to the more complex transatlantic relationship while individual governments continue to reassess the relative value of the Alliance and its possible alternatives. Because NATO probably cannot be replaced in the foreseeable future, the allies will redouble their efforts to modify and redirect its institutions and consultative processes in order to guarantee that their views carry greater weight. Only if the allies believed that US weakness or belligerence threatened European security would they actively pursue new regional defense arrangements. 25X1

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Together, near-term developments in force modernization and arms control will set the limits of future NATO political and institutional adjustment. The outcome of the debate on the future of SALT, for example, will be an important indication for many West Europeans of how Washington balances arms control and modernization objectives. On the other hand, the willingness and capability of allied governments to increase their defense budgets will determine in large part their ability to enhance their policymaking role within NATO. 25X1